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COMITY IN THE FREE TRADE ZONE
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the constant movement of goods, services, people, and
capital across national boundaries, international litigation is becoming
commonplace. This litigation often requires parties who win money
judgments to seek enforcement of the judgment in the defendant's
country.1 In spite of the frequency of this type of litigation, current
United States law on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judg-
ments is unnecessarily disjointed. 2 There are essentially fifty-one differ-
ent laws on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. 3
Thus, achieving consistency and uniformity regarding the enforcement
of foreign judgments in the United States is vital.
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) heightens
the need for the United States to have consistency in the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments. NAFTA breaks down the trade
barriers between Mexico, Canada and the United States, causing in-
creased movement of goods, services, persons, and capital among the
three countries. NAFTA not only necessitates an agreement between
these countries, but also provides the United States with an opportunity
to set policy on the recognition and enforcement of judgments from
foreign country. Such an agreement would be a large step in making
law in this area more consistent and uniform. Also, making a foreign
judgment agreement would make sound economic sense. Countries that
decide to lower the economic barriers between one another must also
work to harmonize political barriers between their countries. Otherwise,
the benefit of lowering of economic barriers is limited.
This Note attempts to look at the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments in the United States in light of NAFTA, which went
into effect January 1, 1994. 4 It will first trace the evolution of the
doctrine of comity in this country and examine the major attempts at
1. See Ronald A. Brand, Enforcement of Foreign Money-Judgments in the United States: In
Search of Uniformity and International Acceptance, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 255 (1991) (de-
claring that "dispute resolution in national courts requires that litigants consider not only the likelihood
of a favorable judgment but also the ability to collect on that judgment").
2. Id. at 255 (stating that "there is scarcely any doctrine of the law which, so far as respects for-
mal and exact statement, is in a more unreduced and uncertain condition than that which relates to the
question what force and effect should be given by the courts of one nation to the judgments rendered
by the courts of another nation").
3. Id. at 262 (determining that "federal courts have consistently held that state law governs judg-
ment recognition and enforcement in diversity cases").
4. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 289 [here-
inafter NAFTA].
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uniformity. North Dakota comity policy will also be analyzed. Cana-
da's and Mexico's policies for the enforcement of foreign country judg-
ments will be discussed separately. Then, two problem areas, antitrust
regulation and libel litigation, will be examined in order to introduce
some of the inherent issues with judgment enforcement in a free trade
area. The judgment enforcement policy of the European Union will be
looked at by way of analogy because it is a free trade area further along
the path to integration than the NAFTA countries. Finally, conclusions
will be drawn as to what action the United States should take with regard
to foreign judgments.
II. UNITED STATES DEVELOPMENT OF COMITY
The most often quoted definition of international comity5 is from
the foundational United States Supreme Court case, Hilton v. Guyot.6 It
defines comity as "the recognition which one nation allows within its
territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation,
having due regard both to international duty and convenience and to the
rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the pro-
tection of its laws." 7 Though some commentators purport that the sub-
ject of comity is undefinable, 8 the difficulty lies not with the doctrine's
definition, but in the mechanics of its application. Comity can be
reasonably defined as the recognition one country gives to the judg-
ments of another country. Nevertheless, the situations comity implicates
and how it will be applied in these instances are a different matter.
A. HILTON V. GUYOT
The seminal case in American jurisprudence on comity and the
enforcement of foreign judgments is Hilton v. Guyot.9 Although Hilton
no longer has binding power on the states due to the Erie Doctrine, 10 the
decision remains a frequently used authority."I The case involved a suit
5. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 267 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "Comity of nations" as "the recog-
nition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of
another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience and to the rights of its
own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws").
6. 159 U.S. 113, 202-03 (1895) (holding that comity induces the United States not to retry legiti-
mate foreign judgments).
7. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
8. See, e.g., Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 3 (1991).
9. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
10. Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (determining that there is no federal com-
mon law).
11. See William C. Honey & Marc Hall, Bases for Recognition of Foreign Nation Money
Judgments in the U.S. and Need for Federal Intervention, 16 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 405, 407
(1993) (stating that Hilton is "quoted widely in judicial opinions"); see also Matthew H. Adler, If We
Build it, Will They Come?-The Need for a Multilateral Convention on the Recognition and
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brought by a French liquidator of the firm of Charles Fortin & Compa-
ny to enforce a French judgment against Henry Hilton and William
Libbey, American citizens who had done business in France under the
name A.T. Stewart & Company. 12 The United States federal district
court directed a verdict in favor of the French plaintiff.13
The defendants appealed, claiming a number of defenses,1 4 in-
cluding a reciprocity defense, which means that this country should not
enforce a foreign country's judgment unless that country is willing to
accept judgments rendered in the United States.15 As such, the defen-
dants argued that the French judgment should not be enforced without
an examination of the merits of the action because under French law
foreign country judgments were retried on the merits. 16 On appeal, the
United States Supreme Court determined that evidence of France's lack
of reciprocity should have been admitted by the trial court. 17 Therefore,
the Court reversed and remanded the case to the circuit court, with
directions to set aside the verdict and to order a new trial. 18
Justice Gray, writing for the majority, after discussing a host of
authorities, concluded that comity should not allow one country to retry
the decisions of another country.19 Specifically, the Court stated:
We are satisfied that where there has been opportunity for
a full and fair trial abroad before a court of competent juris-
diction, conducting the trial upon regular proceedings, after
due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant, and
under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial
administration of justice between the citizens of its own country
and those of other countries, and there is nothing to show
either prejudice in the court, or in the system of laws under
which it was sitting, or fraud in procuring the judgment, or any
other special reason by the comity of this nation should not
allow it full effect, the merits of the case should not, in an
Enforcement of Civil Monetary Judgments, 26 LAW & POL'Y I NT'L B us. 79, 84 (1994) (asserting that
most jurisdictions in the United States have adopted the Hilton requirements).
12. See Hilton, 159 U.S. at 114. Hilton and Libbey carried on a general business in New York
and Paris. Id. They maintained a regular store and place of business in Paris. Id. Charles Fortin &
Co. manufactured and sold gloves in Paris. Id. The two firms dealt with each other in this business
and the instant controversy arose due to these dealings between the two parties. Id.
13. Id. at 122.
14. The defendants claimed there were "gross frauds" in the accounts of the plaintiff. Id. at 117.
They further asserted that "there was not a full and fair trial of the controversies," and that the French
courts were deceived by false statements made by Fortin & Company Id. at 117-18. The defendants
also alleged that the French judgment was "contrary to natural justice and public policy that the said
judgment should not be enforced against a citizen of the United States." Id. at 118.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 211.
18. Id. at 229.
19. Id. at 203-04
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action brought in this country upon the judgment, be tried
afresh, as on a new trial or an appeal, upon the mere assertion
of the party that the judgment was erroneous in law or fact. 20
It is these words from Hilton that give us much of our modem
analysis of comity. 2 1 Several factors to be taken into account in deter-
mining whether to enforce a foreign judgment emanate from this
passage. They include: 1) finality and conclusiveness of the decision;
2) due process considerations; 3) subject matter jurisdiction; 4) personal
jurisdiction; 5) proper notice; and 6) fraud. According to Hilton, if
these basic requirements of justice are met, it is unnecessary to retry a
judgment from a foreign country. 2 2 The foreign judgment then is at
least prima facie evidence of the truth of the matter.23
The foreign judgment can further be considered conclusive if the
reciprocity requirement is satisfied. 24 Since France, if put in a similar
situation, would not recognize an American judgment, (or that of any
other country), the Court reasoned that comity did not require enforce-
ment of a French judgment. 25 The Court, upon examination of the poli-
cy of nations in both Europe and South America, stated, "there is hardly
a civilized nation on either continent which, by its general law, allows
conclusive effect to an executory foreign judgment for the recovery of
money." 26 Further, the Court concluded that "the rule of reciprocity
has worked itself firmly into the structure of international juris-
prudence." 27 The Court rationalized that the doctrine had nothing to do
with individual "retaliation," but was based "upon the broad ground
that international law is founded upon mutuality and reciprocity." 28
The- long-term effect of Hilton has been important, although
limited.2 9 The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law and the
Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act echo many of the
20. Id.
21. See Brand, supra note 1, at 261 (concluding that "judicial decisions, statutes and Restatements
have continued to be built upon the other requirements extracted from the comity analysis in Hilton").
22. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 202-03.
23. Id. at 227 (determining that judgments rendered in a foreign country are not entitled to full
credit and conclusive effect when sued upon in this country, but are prima facie evidence only of the
justice of the plaintiffs' claim).
24. Id. at 228 (holding that the French judgment is not conclusive because reciprocity is lacking).
25. Id. Under French law, foreign-country judgments are examined anew, "unless a treaty to the
contrary effect exists between the said Republic of France and the country in which such judgment is
obtained." Id. at 119.
26. Id. at 227.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 228.
29. Brand, supra note 1, at 261 (concluding that the reciprocity analysis of Hilton "has been
either rejected or ignored by most subsequent courts").
740 [VOL. 74:737
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provisions found in Hilton.30 However, the reciprocity doctrine, which
was so vital to the result in Hilton, has achieved far less support. 3 1
Possibly the biggest piece taken out of Hilton was by a landmark
decision in 1938.
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins 32 made Hilton merely a persuasive
authority for the states. 33 At its core, the Erie Court held that there is no
federal common law. 34 Prior to this case, federal courts in matters of
diversity jurisdiction, often applied "general law" independent of the
state's authority. 35 However, this practice was held unconstitutional
because it "invaded rights which . . . are reserved by the Constitution to
the several states." 36 Thus, because there is no federal authority in terms
of the enforcement of foreign judgments, the appearance to a foreign
court is that application in this country is completely inconsistent. In
practice, this country has fifty-one separate, yet similar rules on the
enforcement of foreign judgments. 37
B. ATTEMPTS AT UNIFORMITY
Since the eradication of any federal common law, other attempts at
making uniform comity laws have emerged. The two primary attempts
at uniformity are the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition
Act (Recognition Act), 3 8 and the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law (Restatement). 39 The Recognition Act has been adopted
by twenty-five states since its appearance in 1962.40 It generally follows
30. See id.
31. See, e.g., Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d at 435, 440 n.8 (1972)
(stating that the reciprocity doctrine "has received no more than desultory acknowledgment").
32. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Tompkins, a citizen of Pennsylvania, was alleged to have been struck,
while walking along a footpath, by something "projecting from one of the moving cars," of Erie
Railroad's train. Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 69 (1938). Erie contended that Pennsylvania
law should govern the action and under Pennsylvania law, Tompkins would be considered a
trespasser. Id. at 70. The Circuit Court of Appeals held that the issue was not one of local, but
"general law," and as such, the court could exercise its independent judgment as to what the law is.
Id.
33. See Brand, supra note 1, at 262 (concluding "federal courts have consistently held that state
law governs judgment recognition and enforcement in diversity cases"). But see John D. Brummett,
Jr., The Preclusive Effect of Foreign Country Judgments in the United States and Federal Choice of
Law: The Role of the Erie Doctrine Reassessed, 33 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 83, 109 (1988) (arguing that
the Erie Doctrine has been misapplied to the enforcement of foreign judgments.)
34. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
35. Id. at 71.
36. Id. at 80.
37. See Brand, supra note 1, at 329 (listing the individual statutes used by all the states and the
District of Columbia for the enforcement of foreign judgments).
38. UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, §§ 1-9, 13 U.L.A. 261 (1997)
[hereinafter RECOGNITION ACT].
39. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN R ELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, §§ 481-82
(1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS].
40. The states that have adopted the Recognition Act are Alaska, California, Colorado, Con
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the Doctrine of Comity delineated in Hilton, except that there is no
reciprocity requirement. The Recognition Act applies to any foreign
money judgment 4 l that is final and conclusive and enforceable where
rendered, even though an appeal is pending or it is subject to appeal.4 2
It has three mandatory grounds for non-recognition:
1. The judgment was rendered under a system which does not
provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with
the requirements of due process of law;
2. the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over
the defendant; and
3. the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over
the subject matter.4 3
The Recognition Act also has six discretionary bases for non-
enforcement.
1. The defendant in the proceedings in the foreign court did
not receive notice of the proceedings in sufficient time to
enable him to defend;
2. the judgment was obtained by fraud;
3. the (cause of action) (claim for relief) on which the judg-
ment is based is repugnant to the public policy of this
state;
4. the judgment conflicts with another final and conclusive
judgment;
5. the proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to an
agreement between the parties under which the dispute in
question was to be settled otherwise than by proceedings in
that court; or
6. in the case of jurisdiction based only on personal service,
the foreign court was a seriously inconvenient forum for
the trial of the actions. 44
The procedural enforcement under the Recognition Act is to be in
the same manner as sister-state judgments under the Full Faith and Credit
necticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minne-
sota, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Texas, Virginia, and Washington. RECOGNITION ACT, supra note 38, § 4 cmt. The District of Columbia
and the Virgin Islands have also adopted the Act.
41. RECOGNITION ACT, supra note 38, § 1. "Foreign state" is defined under the Recognition Act as
"any judgment of a foreign state granting or denying recovery of a sum of money, other than a
judgment for taxes, a fine or other penalty, or a judgment for support in matrimonial or family
matters."
42. Id. § 2.
43. Id. § 4.
44. Id.
[VOL.. 74:737
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Clause of the United States Constitution. 45 The Recognition Act's funda-
mental goal is to provide consistency, which is woefully lacking, to the
treatment of foreign country judgments.4 6 The goal has not been fully
realized. Only twenty-five states have codified the basic language and
six of those have added a reciprocity requirement.4 7
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law is similar to the
Recognition Act, in its codification of Hilton, minus the reciprocity
requirement. There are a few minor differences between the Recogni-
tion Act and the Restatement. First, unlike the Recognition Act, the
Restatement is not limited to only money judgments. 4 8 It includes
judgments "denying recovery of a sum of money, establishing or
confirming the status of a person or determining interests in proper-
ty." 49 Further, the Restatement has only two mandatory reasons for
non-recognition, as it makes subject matter jurisdiction a discretionary
ground.50 The mandatory grounds for non-recognition are lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction and due process of law.S1 These two provisions read
almost exactly like the Recognition Act's provisions. 52
45. Id. § 3. The Act governing sister-state judgments is the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments Act of 1948. See Alan J. Sorkowitz, Enforcing Under the Uniform Foreign
Money-Judgments Recognition Act, 37 No. 5 Prac. Law. 57 (1991) (analyzing the enforcement of
judgments under the Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act).
46. See Honey & Hall, supra note 11, at 408-09; see also Sorkowitz, supra note 45, at 61 (assert-
ing that "the goal was to increase the likelihood that foreign countries will recognize the judgments of
our own American courts").
47. RECOGNITION ACT, supra note 38, § 4 cmt. The states that have adopted a reciprocity
requirement are Florida, Georgia, Massachusetts, Idaho, Ohio, and Texas. Id.
48. Id. § 1. The Recognition Act restricts its language to "foreign judgments" which are defined
as "any judgment of a foreign state granting or denying recovery of a sum of money, other than a
judgment for taxes, a fine or other penalty, or a judgment for support in matrimonial or family
matters." Id.
49. RESTATEMENT oFFOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 39, at § 481(1) (reading in full "Except as
provided in § 482, a final judgment of a court of a foreign state granting or denying recovery of a sum
of money, establishing or confirming the status of a person, or determining interests in property, is
conclusive between the parties, and is entitled to recognition in courts in the United States").
50. This provision reads, "A court in the United States need not recognize a judgment of the
foreign state if the court that rendered the judgment did not have jurisdiction of the subject matter of
the action." RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 39, § 482(2)(a).
51. The provision in full reads, "A court in the United States may not recognize a judgment of the
court of a foreign state if the judgment was rendered under a judicial system that does not provide
impartial tribunals or procedure compatible with due process of law; or the court that rendered the
judgment did not have jurisdiction over the defendant in accordance with the law of the rendering
state and with the rules set forth in § 421. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 39, §
482(l)(a)-(b).
52. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 39, § 482(2)(a)-(b).
NOTE
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The Restatement has six discretionary bases for non-enforcement. 53
They are lack of subject matter jurisdiction, notice, fraud, repugnance to
public policy, res judicata, and contrary to prior agreement. 54 Aside
from subject matter jurisdiction being made discretionary in the Restate-
ment, the only difference between the Restatement and the Recognition
Act, is that the latter has a discretionary forum non conveniens defense.
The following is an analysis of the major and minor defenses to the
recognition of foreign judgments. The ten defenses analyzed here pro-
vide nearly an exhaustive list of the reasons for non-enforcement in the
United States. 55 Although many jurisdictions do not use all ten, most, in
some way, recognize the majority of the defenses that follow. 56 These
defenses will be analyzed in order to gain a thorough understanding of
comity law in the United States and the policies that underlie it.
1. Finality and Conclusiveness of Decision
Whether an action has sufficiently concluded 57 or ended is a consid-
eration to look into in enforcing a foreign judgment. Courts will gener-
ally enforce judgments under the Doctrine of Comity as long as there
has been a decision on the merits of the case.58 A decision that may be
appealed or even modified later can still be considered final. 59 However,
53. Id. §. 482(2)(a)-(f). The discretionary section reads:
(2) A court in the United States need not recognize a judgment of the court of a
foreign state if: (a) the court that rendered the judgment did not have jurisdiction of the
subject matter of the action; (b) the defendant did not receive notice of the proceedings
in sufficient time to enable him to defend; (c) the judgment was obtained by fraud; (d)
the cause of action on which the judgment was based or the judgment itself is repugnant
to the public policy of the United States or of the State where recognition is sought; (e)
the judgment conflicts with another final judgment that is entitled to recognition; or (f) the
proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to an agreement between the parties to
submit the controversy on which the judgment is based to another forum.
54. Id. § 482(2)(a)-(f).
55. Brand, supra note 1, at 268 (holding that the ten factors are those "most often considered by
courts, using the criteria set forth in both the Recognition Act and the Restatement for guidance").
56. Id. at 268.
57. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 290 (defining conclusive as "[s]hutting up a
matter; shutting out all further evidence; not admitting of explanation or contradiction; putting an end to
inquiry; final; irrefutable; decisive. Beyond question or beyond dispute; manifest; plain; clear; obvious;
visible; apparent; indubitable; palpable").
58. Section 481 states, in relevant part, "A final judgment is one that is not subject to additional
proceedings in the rendering court other than execution." RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra
note 39, § 481 cmt. e (1986). See Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 489 F.2d 1313
(2d. Cir. 1973) (ruling that action was final even though judgment was left open for a further arbitra-
tion demand and possibly to obtain further damage); Desjardins Ducharme v. Hunnewell, 585 N.E.2d
321, 324-25 (Mass. 1992) (holding that judgment was conclusive even though main litigation was
ongoing); see also Mayekawa Mfg. Co., Ltd. v. Sasaki, 888 P.2d 183, 187-88 (Wash Ct. App. 1995)
(determining that the Japanese judgment was not final and conclusive because an objection was filed
and under Japanese law, when a timely objection is made, litigation on the merits is still proceeding).
59. See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 39, § 481 cmt. e (stating "that ajudgment
is subject to appeal or to modification in light of changed circumstances does not deprive it of its
[VOL. 74:737
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a court may decide to stay enforcement until an appeal or modification
is complete. 60
Mayekawa Manufacturing v. Sasaki,61 illustrates how another coun-
try's procedures can make the issue of finality difficult to determine.62
In this case, a Japanese judgment was found to be non-conclusive. 63
Mayekawa Manufacturing had obtained a Japanese judgment against
Satoshi Sasaki. 64 The judgment was preliminarily enforceable in Japan,
but the procedures of the judgment were unusual. 65 The initial "special
procedure" was one that limited live testimony, prohibited witness state-
ments, and counterclaims. 66 However, if a party is not satisfied with the
result of this "special procedure," the party may object, as Sasaki did in
this case.67
After an objection, the case then shifts to a "regular procedure"
where a trial is conducted on the merits of the case without the con-
straints of the "special procedure." 68 Although the "special proce-
dure" had been objected to in this case, the "regular procedure" had
not yet taken place. 69 The court relied on the plain language of a Japa-
nese statute that stated a judgment which is objected to is not final and
conclusive. 70 Consequently, the court refused to enforce the Japanese
judgment. 71
character as a final judgment").
60. Id. § 481 cmt. e.
61. 888 P.2d 183 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995).
62. Mayekawa Mfg. Co., Ltd. v. Sasaki, 888 P.2d 183, 189 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 184.
65. Id. at 187.
66. Id. at 185. The court quoted Hideyuki Sakai, attorney for Sasaki, who explained the "special
Japanese proceeding."
In this special procedure, judgment is rendered upon submission by the Plaintiff of copies
of the notes or checks. The introduction of live testimony is not allowed except for the
sole limited purpose of establishing the authenticity of the documents or to prove
presentation of a note, draft, or check. Live testimony concerning a fact other than the
two above mentioned matters is completely prohibited. The affirmative defense is
allowed, but only if it may be established under the rigid restrictions on the introduction
of evidence employed in the special procedure. Counterclaims are not allowed.
Additionally, the civil procedure law do [sic] not allow for witness statements in the
special procedure. No prior notice of documents to be presented at the hearing is
required to be given to the adverse party. The documents may be simply presented to the
court for examination of the time of the hearing.
Id.
67. Id. According to the court's quotation of Sakai, "the objection is not an appeal because a
judgment rendered on the special procedure is neither final nor conclusive if an objection is filed." Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 187.
71. Id. at 189. The court concluded "that the enforcement of [the] judgment in the United States
might well lead to inconsistent interpretations and enforcement of foreign law." Id.
NOTE
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2. Due Process
The phrase "due process of law" stems from constitutional guaran-
tees found in the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments, which state that
citizens may not be deprived of "life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." 72 The amorphous concept of due process can basically
be defined as, "a course of legal proceedings according to those rules
and principles which have been established in our systems of juris-
prudence for the enforcement and protection of private rights." 73 As a
requirement for judgment enforcement, it was originally expressed in
Hilton.74
To pass due process muster, an American court must be adequately
convinced of the fairness of the judicial system that made the decision. 75
Generally, differences between the foreign country's methods and our
own are not enough to deny recognition, unless something more is
shown. 76 Two areas frequently litigated under the umbrella of due pro-
cess are jurisdiction 77 and notice of process, 78 even though each can be
challenged under individual grounds as well. Jurisdictional requirements
are generally tested by International Shoe v. Washington79 and its
progeny.80
A case that illustrates how a judicial system with different methods
can be found not to violate due process is Ingersoll Milling Machine Co.
72. U.S. CONST. amend. V (guaranteeing that "no person shall ... be deprived life liberty or prop-
erty, without due process of law"); U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § I (guaranteeing that "no state shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life liberty, or property without due process of law").
73. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 500 (defining "due process of law").
74. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 114, 205-06 (1985) (declaring that if a decision, "rendered by
a competent court, having jurisdiction of the cause and of the parties, and upon due allegations and
proofs, and opportunity to defend against them, and its proceedings are according to a course of
civilized jurisprudence, and are stated in a clear and formal record, the judgment is prima facie
evidence, at least, of the truth of the matter adjudged") (emphasis added).
75. RESTATEMENT OFFOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 39, § 482 cmt. b (declaring that "[a] court
asked to recognize or enforce the judgment of a foreign court must satisfy itself of the essential
fairness of the judicial system under which it was rendered").
76. See Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co. v. Granger, 833 F.2d 680, 686 (7th Cir. 1987) (concluding
that under due process "the similarity or dissimilarity of the Belgian procedures is not the issue"); see
also Sorkowitz, supra note 45, at 62 (asserting that "not every difference between a foreign system
and our own is sufficient to warrant a finding that the foreign system does not afford due process").
77. See, e.g., Southern v. Southern, 258 S.E.2d 422, 425 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that due to
lack of minimum contacts an English court lacked in personam jurisdiction over the defendant); see
also Brand, supra note 1, at 270 (stating that "the element of due process has arisen principally in the
context of personal jurisdiction").
78. See Condre v. Silberstein, 744 F. Supp. 429 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (ruling that the defendant did not
receive notice); see also Vrozos v. Sarantopoulos, 552 N.E.2d 1093 (111. 1990).
79. 326 U.S. 310 (1945); see also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987);
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 44 U.S. 286 (1980).
80. Brand, supra note 1, at 270.
746 [VOL. 74:737
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v. Granger.81 Granger won a money judgment from a Belgian court. 82
He sought enforcement of the judgment in an Illinois federal court. 83
Ingersoll challenged the due process safeguards of the Belgian system. 84
Ingersoll was not allowed to cross-examine witnesses because Granger
did not present himself in front of the court. 85 Ingersoll was also unable
to present live testimony except by letters rogatory. 86
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in determining whether due
process requirements are met, stated "the similarity or dissimilarity of
the Belgian procedures to our own is not the issue; the issue is only the
basic fairness of the foreign procedures." 87 "Ingersoll never petitioned
the Belgian court to hear live testimony outside of Belgium." 88 Further,
Ingersoll also called no witnesses, so he is partly responsible for the
omission of cross-examination in the proceeding. 89 For these reasons,
the court, agreeing with the lower court, found that the procedures of the
"Belgian judicial system were fundamentally fair and did not produce
an injustice." 90 Although Belgium had different procedures than Ameri-
can courts, comity allows the United States to look beyond differences to
questions of fundamental fairness.
3. Personal Jurisdiction
Personal jurisdiction or in personam jurisdiction is the "power
which a court has over the defendant's person and which is required
before a court can enter a personal or in personam judgment." 9 1
Personal Jurisdiction is the element most often found deficient in foreign
81. 833 F.2d 680 (7th. Cit. 1987).
82. Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co. v. Granger, 833 F.2d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 1987). Ingersoll and a
Belgian company also prevailed on counterclaims. Id. However, Granger's award against Ingersoll
was for 3,860,081 BF (Belgian francs) and the counterclaims in favor of Ingersoll and the Belgian
Company were for 317,218 BF and 428,233 BF respectively. Id.
83. Id. By this time Ingersoll had already brought suit in an Illinois Court (Winnebago County)
against Granger. Id. at 682. Granger first sought to get the suit dismissed, but the district court instead
"stayed proceedings pending the outcome of the Belgian appellate process." Id. at 683. After the
decision was affirmed by a Labour Court of Appeal in Belgium, "Granger filed a counterclaim in the
Illinois suit seeking enforcement of the Belgian judgment." Id.
84. Id. at 686.
85. Id. at 687. "The Belgian Labor Court does not allow cross-examination of a party or a
party's witnesses if that party does not put himself or his witnesses before the tribunal to testify." Id.
86. Id. "Letters rogatory" is defined as "a request by one court of another court in an
independent jurisdiction, that a witness be examined upon interrogatories sent with the request. The
medium whereby one country, speaking through one of its courts, requests another country, acting
through its own courts and by methods of court procedure peculiar thereto and entirely within the
latter's control, to assist the administration of justice in the former country." See BLACK'S LAW
DICIONARY, supra note 5, at 905 (defining "Letters rogatory").
87. Granger, 833 F.2d at 688.
88. Id. at 687.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 688.
91. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 854 (defining "Jurisdiction in personam").
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judgment recognition actions. 92 The Recognition Act lists six acceptable
jurisdictional bases, which are widely accepted: 93
1. The defendant was served personally in the foreign state;
2. the defendant voluntarily appeared in the proceedings,
other than for the purpose of protecting property seized in
threatened with seizure in the proceeding or of contesting
the jurisdiction of the court over him;
3. the defendant prior to commencement of the proceeding
had agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the foreign
court with respect to the subject matter involved;
4. the defendant was domiciled in the foreign state when the
proceedings were instituted, or, being a body corporate
had its principal place of business, was incorporated, or
had otherwise acquired corporate status, in the foreign
state;
5. the defendant had a business office in the foreign state and
the proceeding in the foreign court involved a [cause of
action] [claim for relief] arising out of such operation.94
The Recognition Act also has a catchall jurisdictional basis, which
provides that courts "may recognize other bases of jurisdiction." 9 5
Whatever a state does, the due process rules already discussed are the
foundational requirements for what will be acceptable grounds of
personal jurisdiction. States may accept only due process requirements
or demand more. 96 Also, a court may recognize a judgment based on
foreign jurisdictional requirements not recognizable in the United States
if there is another basis accepted as legitimate in the United States that
would have supported the action. 97
One case in which a foreign country money judgment was found to
be lacking in personal jurisdiction is Koster v. Automark Industries,
Inc.98 Hendrik Koster received a default judgment against Automark in
92. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 39, § 482 cmt. c.
93. Sorkowitz, supra note 45, at 64 (stating these bases of jurisdiction "are recognized almost
universally and are reasonably easy to apply").
94. RECOGNITION AcT, supra note 38, § 5(a).
95. Id. § 5(b).
96. See Siedler v. Jacobson, 383 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1976). The jurisdictional requirements would
have satisfied New York's long-arm statute, but the court still refused enforcement because it held
that the state foreign judgment statute was not as liberal as its own "transaction of business" test. Id.
97. See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 39, § 482 cmt. c (explaining that "if the
judgment of the foreign court is founded on a basis of jurisdiction not meeting the standards of § 421
... but another basis of jurisdiction would have supported the action ... a court in the United States
may recognize and enforce the judgment").
98. 640 F.2d 77 (7th Cir. 1981).
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a district court in Amsterdam, Netherlands. 99 Enforcement was sought in
the United States.100 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals determined
that whether a court may "assert jurisdiction over a foreign defendant
depends upon whether the company 'purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State.""101 Auto-
mark's contacts with the Netherlands included eight letters, a telegram,
and a transatlantic telephone call.' 0 2 These contacts were in pursuit of a
contract between the two parties that led up to a meeting in Milan,
Italy.1 03 The court determined that these contacts did not satisfy the due
process requirements of jurisdiction because, "such a result would make
virtually every business subject to suit in any state with which it hap-
pened to communicate in some manner." 104 This result and others may
show a willingness on the part of American courts to scrutinize the
personal jurisdiction of foreign courts more closely than sister-state
judgments since burdens on the defendant are greater.105
4. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the "power of a particular
court to hear the type of case that is then before it."106 Subject matter
jurisdiction rarely is found to deny recognition of a foreign judg-
ment.107 Under the Recognition Act, it is a mandatory basis for non-
recognition, while under the Restatement of Foreign Relations, it is a
discretionary ground for non-recognition.108 Under the Restatement,
non-recognition is discretionary because a foreign court is generally
presumed to have legitimate subject matter jurisdiction.l0 9 Under either
99. Koster v. Automark Indus., Inc., 640 F.2d 77, 78 (7th Cir. 1981). The case was brought based
on an alleged breach of contract. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977)). The court further said that "this
means that the company must pass a threshold of minimum contacts with the forum state so that it is
fair to subject it to the jurisdiction of that state's courts." Id. (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980); International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
102. Id. at 79.
103. Id. at 78. Koster and Automark negotiated for approximately five months before
contracting in Milan. Id.
104. Id. at 79.
105. See Royal Bank of Canada v. Trentham Corp., 491 F. Supp. 404, 407 (D. Tex. 1980)
(concluding that "a foreign country's assertion of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
still may be subjected to closer examination than that of our sister states, if only because the burdens
on the defendant may be far greater there because of possibly greater distances and languages
differences").
106. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 854 (defining "jurisdiction of the subject
matter").
107. Brand, supra note 1, at 273.
108. RECOGNITION ACT, supra note 38, § 4(a)(3); RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note
39, § 482(2)(a).
109. Id. § 482 cmt. d. "An inquiry into possible lack of competence is initiated only on the basis
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the Restatement or Recognition Act, a technical jurisdictional mistake by
a foreign court in its allocation of work will generally not be grounds for
non-recognition. 110
5. Extrinsic Fraud
It stands to reason that a fraudulent judgment by a foreign court
should not be recognized in the United States. However, one must
distinguish between extrinsic fraud and intrinsic fraud, the former
generally being the only acceptable basis to non-recognition."II Extrin-
sic fraud is fraud on the court, that is a "fraudulent action by the prevail-
ing party that deprived the losing party of adequate opportunity to
present its case to the court."ll 2 Slightly different is intrinsic fraud, such
as perjured testimony or falsified documents,113 which were litigated or
could have been litigated in the rendering court.11 4 The logic is that if it
was or could have been litigated in the rendering court, it should not be
retried in a United States court. However, if the fraud was such that it
could not have been litigated in the rendering court, then it is grounds
for non-recognition.
A case that demonstrates the difficulty of proving extrinsic fraud is
Norkan Lodge Company Ltd. v. Gillum.115 Norkan Lodge Company
of a credible challenge by the judgment debtor or by another person resisting recognition or
enforcement." § 482 cmt. a. Subject matter jurisdiction is not presumed if the order of the foreign
court affects rights in land in the United States or ights in a United States patent, trademark, or
copyright. § 482 cmt. d.
110. Id. § 482 cmt. d (stating that, "whether a particular court in a foreign state was the right one
to adjudicate a dispute-for instance, whether the dispute was civil or commercial in nature or
whether it should have been heard in a different city-is in general not subject to challenge before the
court asked to recognize the judgment, especially if the issue was or could have been contested in the
rendering court"). See Sorkowitz, supra note 45, at 62 (stating that "a lack of competence in the
foreign court that was unnoticed by both parties and the court itself may, in some cases, be irrelevant
to the merits and insufficient to warrant non-recognition, especially when it resulted from some
technicality of the foreign country's laws relating to the division of work among various courts").
I 1. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 39, § 482 cmt. e.
112. Id. § 482 cmt. e. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY defines "fraud on court" as "a scheme to
interfere with judicial machinery performing task of impartial adjudication, as by preventing opposing
party from fairly presenting his case or defense. Finding of fraud on the court is justified only by most
egregious misconduct directed to the court itself such as bribery of a judge or jury to fabrication of
evidence by counsel and must be supported by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence .... It
consists of conduct so egregious that it undermines the integrity of the judicial process." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 661.
113. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 39, § 482 cmt. e.
114. Bank of Nova Scotia v. Tschabold Equipment Ltd., 754 P.2d 1290, 1294-95 (Wash. 1988)
(indicating that "fraud involving the merits of a case or issues that were, or could have been litigated,
is not a basis under the Foreign Money-Judgments Act for denying a recognition of foreign
judgments"); see RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 39, § 482 cmt. e. Section 482
comment e says that the definition of fraud normally used is that of the state determining recognition.
"If the judgment could be set aside in the rendering state, the court in the United States where
enforcement is sought should stay the action for enforcement in order to give the judgment debtor a
reasonable opportunity to petition the rendering court to set the judgment aside .... RESTATEMENT OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 39, § 482 cmt. e.
115. 587 F. Supp. 1457 (N.D. Tex. 1984).
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Limited (Norkan) obtained a Canadian money judgment against Randy
Gillum.l16 Norkan then filed an action in Texas to have the judgment
enforced.' 17 One of Gillum's contentions was that the foreign country
judgment was obtained by fraud. 118 Gillum asserted three areas of fraud
by the Canadian court. First, he argued that "fraud occurred when
Norkan's counsel presented portions of Gillum's deposition to the
Canadian court without reading into the record certain other portions of
Gillum's deposition."11 9 Second, Gillum contended that one witness's
deposition testimony and trial testimony were inconsistent, thus resulting
in fraud. 120 Thirdly, Gillum stated that the trial court's acceptance of
another witnesses testimony instead of Gillum's testimony also was
fraudulent.121 The court said that in order for a case to constitute fraud:
it must appear the fraud practised, unmixed with any fault or
negligence of the party complaining, prevented him from
making a full and fair defense, and that the fraud complained
of was not involved in, or presented to, the court of first in-
stance either at the original trial or in a petition for review.122
Consequently, the court found the issues Gillum raised to be "cred-
ibility questions and simple facts issues" rather than fraud.123 As to the
inconsistencies Gillum raised, the court determined that the Canadian
court had all the evidence before it when reaching the conclusions it
did.124 Further, the court also took into account that Gillum failed to
appear for the trial and contest Norkan's version of the facts.125 Gillum
demonstrates that extrinsic fraud is a difficult defense to assert unless
there is something fraudulent that could not have been asserted in the
foreign court.
116. Norkan Lodge Co. Ltd. v. Gillum, 587 F. Supp. 1457, 1458 (N.D. Tex. 1984).
117. Id. at 1458-59.
118. Id. at 1460.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1461. The court further said that "false testimony or fabricated documents are not suf-
ficient to justify the interference of a court of equity, if they have been presented to the court
determining the law and fact in the first instance." Id.
123. Id. at 1460.
124. Id. at 1460-61.
125. Id. at 1461.
NOTE
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
6. Notice
The Recognition Act and Restatement read almost identically in
stating that a judgment in which the defendant "did not receive notice of
the proceeding in sufficient time to enable him to defend," may be
rejected.126 Although non-recognition under both is discretionary, it is
unlikely that a United States court would recognize a foreign judgment
if there had been true lack of notice. 127 The lack of notice issue arises
solely in default judgments because if the defendant appeared, it logical-
ly follows that notice was adequate.12 8 Courts may construe proper
notice to mean that which is in compliance with the foreign country's
rules of service. 129 Conversely, courts may simply inquire into whether
the defendant had actual notice of the proceeding.130 Notice received by
the defendant in a language she does not understand has been
considered proper notice.131
A case that examines notice requirements is Ackermann v. Levine.132
In this case, Peter Ackermann sued Ira Levine in Germany. 133 A sum-
mons and complaint was routed through the German Consulate in New
York and then sent by registered mail from there to Levine's former
address in New Jersey. 134 Levine claims that he never received that
process.135 A second summons and complaint were sent by the same
method to Levine's Manhattan address and signed for by a building
employee.136 Levine acknowledges receiving this process and having
actual knowledge of the suit.137 Levine chose not to defend the suit and
126. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 39, § 482(2)(b); RECOGNITION ACT, supra
note 38, § 4(b)(l).
127. Jonathan H. Pittman, The Public Policy Exception to the Recognition of Foreign Judgments,
22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 969, 978 (1989) (determining that "despite the discretionary nature" of the
notice requirement, "it seems unlikely that any United States court would recognize a foreign
judgment when there has been lack of notice").
128. Id.
129. Brand, supra note 1, at 274 (citing to Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
130. Id. at 274; see Pittman, supra note 127, at 978 (concluding that "while the rule seems to be
that, 'effective service of process' is required for adequate notice, United States courts are primarily
concerned with whether the defendant had actual notice and do not generally consider the sufficiency
of the foreign states statutory notice provisions").
131. Tahan, 662 F.2d at 865. The defendant received personal service in Israel, in the Hebrew
language, which the defendant did not understand. Id. However, the defendant had done business in
Israel for several years and was aware of the legal nature of the papers. Id.
132. 788 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1986).
133. Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 837 (2d Cir. 1986). Ackermann sued Levine for
attorney's fees he expended while working on behalf of Levine. Id. at 836-37.
134. Id. at 837.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. "Levine testified that on at least one occasion before judgment was entered, he
consulted ... [an attorney] about the suit and he decided to ignore it." Id.
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a default judgment was entered against him. 138 Ackermann sued in the
United District Court for the Southern District of New York, seeking
enforcement of the German judgment.139
The court in Ackermann determined that "service of process must
satisfy both the statute under which service is effectuated and constitu-
tional Due Process.' 4 0 The statutory authority governing the case, [the
court held], was the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial
and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (Hague
Convention)."141 The court found that mail service was legitimate under
the Hague Convention 42 and passed due process muster. 143 The court
stated that the lower court erred in holding that service must satisfy state
service of process requirements.144 The court determined that if the
Hague Convention is applicable, it should be applied. 145 If the Conven-
tion is not applicable, then federal, rather than state law should govern. 146
This case demonstrates that even where service of process is not effectu-
ated according to state law, the notice requirement may still be met.
7. Contrary to Public Policy
A judgment that is contrary to public policy means that it is "repug-
nant to fundamental notions of what is decent and just in the State where
enforcement is sought."1 47 Public policy is similar to the "due pro-
cess" defense to enforcement in its potentially broad application 48 and
overlap into other areas.' 4 9 In order to violate public policy, courts
generally limit application to situations where the original claim is repug-
nant to fundamental notions of what is decent and just in the recognition
138. Id. After appeal had lapsed, the judgment became final on February 20, 1981. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 838.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 839-40. The lower court found that service of process violated the Hague Convention.
Id. at 834. Nevertheless, on appeal, service was found to comport with Articles 8 and 10 of the
convention. Id. at 839.
143. Id. at 841. The court spoke in conclusory terms about due process. Id. (citing Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950), which indicates that process by mail
comports with due process as long as the service provides "notice reasonably calculated ... to provide
interested parties notice of the pendency of the action").
144. Id.
145. Id. at 840. The court's rationale was as follows: "To construe the convention otherwise
would unduly burden foreign judgment holders with the procedural intricacies of fifty states." Id.
146. Id.
147. Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
148. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 981 (stating that "theoretically, a defendant
could claim a violation of public policy anytime there is a variation between the procedure or result in
a foreign court and in a United States Court").
149. Other singular bases for enforcement are sometimes argued under the umbrella of public
policy; for instance: Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862 (1981) (Notice); Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia
Chewing Gum Corp, 453 F.2d 435 (1971) (Personal Jurisdiction).
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forum. 150 Some courts have held that a public policy defense cannot be
raised if the defendant defaulted on the issue that is the basis for the
defense.151 However, other courts have disagreed, stating that a defen-
dant, having defaulted in a foreign action, may raise a defense of public
policy.1 52 The fact that a certain claim has been abolished in a particular
state does not necessarily mean enforcement of that claim would be
contrary to public policy.' 53
A case involving a public policy challenge is McCord v. Jet Spray
International Corp.154 George McCord of Belgium sued Jet Spray Inter-
national of Massachusetts in Belgium. 155 McCord received a money
judgment due to Jet Spray's breach of an employment contract.I5 6 He
then sought enforcement of the judgment in Massachusetts.1 57 Jet Spray
argued that the judgment is repugnant to the public policy of the state
and should not be enforced because the employment contract at issue in
the case would not be enforceable under Massachusetts law. 158 The
court said that the "public policy exception" is a high standard and that
the judgment must tend to clearly undermine the "public interest, the
public confidence in the administration of the law, or security for indi-
vidual rights of personal liberty or of private property."159 The court
found that the mere difference in the law does not violate public policy
because the conflict does not offend the court's sense of justice, nor com-
promises the public welfare. 160 McCord v. Jet Spray International Corp.
demonstrates that often something more must be shown than a differ-
ence between a foreign country's law and a state's law in order for a
foreign judgment to violate public policy.
150. RECOGNITION ACT, supra note 38, § 4 cmt.; see also RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS,
supra note 39, § 482 cmt. f (stating that "courts will not recognize or enforce foreign judgments based
on claims perceived to be contrary to fundamental notions of decency and justice") Id.
151. Pittman, supra note 127, at 985 (citing Tahan, 662 F.2d at 867).
152. See, e.g., Ackerman v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 842 (2d Cir. 1986) (declaring that "we dis-
agree with dicta ... suggesting that a defendant may not raise a public policy defense once he has
defaulted in the foreign adjudication").
153. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 38, § 482(f).
154. 874 F. Supp. 436 (D. Mass. 1994)
155. McCord v. Jet Spray Int'l Corp., 874 F. Supp. 436, 437 (D. Mass. 1994).
156. Id.
157. Id. McCord was unable to satisfy the judgment in Belgium. Id.
158. Id. at 438. Jet Spray claimed that the employment contract lied at the center of the judgment
and was in conflict with Massachusetts policy of "at-will" employment contract. Id. Further, Jet
Spray contended that the contract was designed to defraud the Belgian government. Id. at 438-39.
159. Id. at 439.
160. Id.
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8. Inconsistent Judgments
Inconsistent judgments refers to those judgments that are "contrary,
the one to the other, so that both cannot stand but the acceptance or
establishment of the one implies the abrogation or abandonment of the
other."161 This rule applies the principle of res judicata to foreign judg-
ments. Under the Restatement, courts are likely to recognize the later in
time of the two inconsistent judgments, although they may potentially
recognize the earlier judgment or neither judgment. 162 When an other-
wise legitimate foreign country judgment is made after a sister-state
court judgment, there is no automatic preference for the sister-state
judgment.163
One case that deals with inconsistent judgments is Gannon v.
Payne.164 Fred Gannon and Robert Payne were involved in a joint ven-
ture for oil and gas production in Alberta Province. 165 Due to a dispute
over the distribution of profits, Payne sued Gannon in Canada. 166 Payne
won a judgment against Gannon in that forum. 167 Payne sued Gannon
again, this time in Texas. 168 Two years after Payne sued Gannon in
Texas, Gannon sued for a declaratory judgment in Canada.169 Gannon
was seeking to obtain a ruling that some of the matters raised in Texas
had already been litigated in Canada.170  "Payne then filed an
application for a temporary injunction seeking to prohibit Gannon from
prosecuting or taking any action in the Canadian court."1 7 1 The trial
court granted the motion.172
One of the rationales that the trial court relied on in granting the
motion was a concern about inconsistent judgments.173 On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Texas determined that the possibility of inconsistent
judgments did not justify an anti-suit injunction regarding a case pend-
ing in a different country.1 74 The court noted that other courts have
upheld the issuance of an anti-suit injunction in similar situations. 175
161. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 766 (defining "inconsistent").
162. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 38, § 482 cmt. g.
163. Id.
164. 706 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. 1986).
165. Gannon v. Payne, 706 S.W.2d 304, 305 (Tex. 1986).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 307.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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However, such a result in this case would render comity useless. 176 Al-
though the Gannon court allowed the Canadian proceeding to continue,
it concluded that "there should be only one judgment recognized in
both forums."' 177
9. Prior Agreement
Freedom to contract is an important American policy. Thus,
American courts have the discretion to refrain from enforcing judgments
contrary to an exclusive choice of forum because it undermines the
policy of favoring forum selection clauses. 178 Typically, this defense
will only come about in default judgments because when defendants
participate in a forum, they are waiving any previous choice of forum
and agreeing to the new forum. 179
A case that demonstrates that this rule likely only applies to adverse
parties, not two defendants, is Bank of Nova Scotia v. Tschabold Equip-
ment Ltd.180 While this action was being litigated in Canada, the two
defendants, Pacific Western and Tschabold Equipment Limited (Tscha-
bold) entered into an agreement.181 Tschabold agreed that it "would
take care of' the Canadian case. 182 The Bank of Nova Scotia (Nova
Scotia) won a default judgment against Pacific Western. 183 Nova Scotia
then sought enforcement of the judgment in the state of Washington. 184
On appeal, one of Pacific Western's defenses to enforcement was that the
prior agreement between the two defendants should bar enforcement of
the action. 185 However, the court concluded that this rule only applies to
agreements between adverse parties. 186
10. Forum non conveniens
Forum non conveniens "refers to [the] discretionary power of [a]
court to decline jurisdiction when convenience of parties and ends of
justice would be better served if [the] action were brought and tried in
another forum."1 87 This rule allowing non-recognition when a foreign
176. Id. The court stated that "if the principle of comity is to have any application, a single
parallel proceeding filed in a party's home country cannot justify issuing an anti-suit injunction." Id.
177. Id.
178. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 39, at § 482 cmt. h.
179. Id.
180. 754 P.2d 1290 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988).
181. Bank of Nova Scotia v. Tschabold Equip. Ltd., 754 P.2d 1290, 1293 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1296.
186. Id.
187. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 655 (defining "Forum non conveniens").
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forum is seriously inconvenient is found in the Recognition Act, but not
in the Restatement. 188 The Recognition Act's rule is limited to instances
where jurisdiction is based only on personal service, and the foreign
court was a seriously inconvenient forum for the trial.189 A United States
court will not enforce a judgment only if the court believes the original
action should have been dismissed by the foreign country court on
grounds of forum non conveniens.190 The foreign court need not have
the Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine.'191 The United States court simply
determines whether the foreign court should have dismissed the case if it
did have the Doctrine.192
Forum non conveniens was raised as a defense in Bank of Montreal
v. Kough.193 A default judgment was entered against Jack Kough and in
favor of the Bank of Montreal (Bank) in an action in British Colum-
bia.194 The Bank then sought enforcement of the action in federal court
in California. 195 One of the defenses raised by Kough is that the forum
in British Columbia was seriously inconvenient. 196 The court refused to
accept the defense because under the Recognition Act, the enforcing
court must find that the original action should have dismissed the action
on the basis of forum non conveniens.197 The court determined that the
British Columbian forum was not seriously inconvenient. 198 A fact that
likely played a role in the holding was that the contract upon which the
litigation is based was signed in British Columbia. 199 This case demon-
strates that because forum non conveniens is a discretionary basis of
non-enforcement, it may be difficult to receive the desired action
(non-enforcement).
D. COMITY IN NORTH DAKOTA
North Dakota comity policy will be analyzed to gain insight into the
procedure for enforcing a judgment in this state. Second, it provides an
opportunity to see some of the difficulties associated with the enforce-
188. RECOGNITION ACT, supra note 38, § 4(b)(6).
189. Id. § 4(b)(6).
190. ID. §4cmt.
191. Brand, supra note 1, at 277.
192. Id.
193. 430 F. Supp. 1243 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
194. Bank of Montreal v. Kough, 430 F. Supp. 1243, 1245 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
195. Id. at 1246.
196. Id. at 1250.
197. Id. at 1251. The relevant provision of the Recognition Act "authorizes a court to refuse
recognition and enforcement of a judgment rendered in a foreign country on the basis only of personal
service when it believes the original action should have been dismissed by the court in the foreign
country on grounds of forun non conveniens." RECOGNITION ACT, supra note 38, § 4 cmt.
198. Kough, 430 F. Supp. at 1251.
199. Id.
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ment of foreign judgments at the state level. Since North Dakota has no
statutory provision for the recognition or enforcement of foreign
country judgments,200 rules of comity have been developed through case
law. The primary North Dakota case is Medical Arts Building Limited v.
Eralp.20 l In Eralp, a Winnipeg, Manitoba court granted a judgment in
favor of the plaintiff against the defendant, Muammer Suha Eralp for
unpaid rent.202 The Walsh County District Court in North Dakota
enforced the Canadian money judgment. 203
On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the
enforcement of the Canadian judgment. 204 The Eralp court's comity
analysis generally followed the Hilton analysis. 205 The court quoted
from Hilton the portion that lists the numerous factors to be taken into
account when determining whether to enforce a judgment:
When an action is brought in a court of this country, by a
citizen of a foreign country against one of our own citizens...
and the foreign judgment appears to have been rendered by a
competent court having jurisdiction of the cause and of the
parties, and upon due allegations and proofs, and opportunity
to defend against them, and its proceedings are according to
the course of a civilized jurisprudence, and are stated in a clear
and formal record, the judgment is prima facie evidence, at
least, of the truth of the matter adjudged; and it should be held
conclusive upon the merits tried in the foreign court, unless
some special ground is shown for impeaching the judgment, as
by showing that it was affected by fraud or prejudice, or that
by the principles of international law, and by the comity of our
own country, it should not be given full credit and effect. 206
The defendant's primary defense to the enforcement of the
Canadian money-judgment was that reciprocity, as found in Hilton, was a
200. Medical Arts Bldg. Ltd. v. Eralp, 290 N.W.2d 241, 242 (1980). The North Dakota Supreme
Court ruled that North Dakota Century Code § 28-20.1 does not include judgments from foreign
countries. Id.
201. 290 N.W.2d 241 (1980).
202. Medical Arts Bldg. Ltd. v. Eralp, 290 N.W.2d 241, 246 (1980). Eralp allegedly owed rent
for the period from March 1, 1976 to Jan. 1, 1978, totaling $5,317.21 (Canadian dollars). Id. He had
allegedly moved to Grafton, ND after failing to pay rent in Canada. Id.
203. Id. The defendant Eralp alleged that the Walsh County District Court lacked subject matter
and personal jurisdiction and that any judgment entered by the Canadian court was against the public
policy of the United States and of the State of North Dakota. Id. Neither party personally appeared
nor introduced any evidence except portions of the Canadian record of the case. Id. The parties
attorneys presented arguments on behalf of their clients. Id.
204. Id. at 247.
205. Id. at 245.
206. Id. (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 205 (1895)).
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prerequisite to enforcing foreign judgments. 20 7  The court rejected this
argument, instead concluding that Hilton did not require reciprocity as a
prerequisite to enforcement.2 08  This conclusion was based on the
following provision from Hilton:
The reasonable if not necessary conclusion appears to be that
judgments rendered in France, or in any other foreign country
by the laws of which our own judgments are reviewable upon
the merits, are not entitled to full credit and conclusive effect
when sued upon in this country but are prima facie evidence
only of the justice of the plaintiff's claim.209
The Eralp court reasoned that, under Hilton, a foreign-country money
judgment lacking reciprocity only limits the judgment to prima facie
evidence of being correct; reciprocity is not a prerequisite to enforce-
ment.2 1
0
For further support for the idea that reciprocity is not an integral
part of comity, nor a prerequisite to enforcement of foreign judgments,
the Eralp court cited several cases rejecting the reciprocity doctrine. 21 l
Upon concluding that the foreign judgment is due prima facie evidence
of being correct, the court sought to define "prima facie evidence." 212
The court determined that there is "little or no difference between a
judgment which is prima facie evidence and has not been overcome by
counter evidence and a judgment which is conclusive." 213 Consequent-
ly, the court in Eralp ruled that the lower court had this in mind when it
determined that the "judgment in question was conclusive after observ-
207. Id. at 243.
208. Id.
209. Id. (quoting Hilton, 159 U.S. at 227).
210. Id.
211. See id. at 243-45 (citing Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Hall, 367 F. Supp 1009 (N.D. Ark.
1973); Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3d. Cir. 1971); Nicol v.
Tanner, 256 N.W.2d 796 (Minn. 1976)).
212. Eralp, 290 N.W.2d at 245. The court quoted the definition of prima facie evidence: "the
term 'prima facie evidence,' which frequently appears in cases, denotes evidence which, if
unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient in a jury case to carry the case to the jury and to sustain a
verdict in favor of the issue which it supports, but which may be contradicted by other evidence ... A
prima facie evidence rule is nothing more or less than a rule of evidence, and it is not a rule of
substantive law: it has reference and applies only to the mode or manner by and through which facts
essential to a judgment or conviction might be established." Id. (citing 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 4, at
38 (1980)). The court defined prima facie evidence as "that which, either alone or aided by other
facts presumed from those established by the evidence, shows the existence of the fact which it is
adduced to prove, unless overcome by counter evidence; it is evidence which, unexplained or
uncontradicted, is sufficient to maintain the proposition affirmed." Id. (citing 32A C.J.S. Evidence §
1016, at 624 (1980)). The Eralp court quoted a past North Dakota Supreme Court case, Schnoor v.
Meinecke, 40 N.W.2d 803 (N.D. 1950), which defined prima facie evidence as "sufficient evidence
upon which a party would be entitled to recover, providing his opponent produced no further
testimony." Id. at 246.
213. Id. at 246.
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ing that no evidence was introduced except the certificate and the
Canadian memorandum opinion."214
In scrutinizing the Eralp court's comity analysis, some problems
emerge. The court distorts the reciprocity analysis of Hilton. Eralp
states that Hilton neither requires reciprocity as a prerequisite to enforce-
ment, nor does it find reciprocity to be an "integral party of comity." 2 15
The Eralp court is correct in concluding that reciprocity is not a
prerequisite to enforcement and in determining that even a judgment
lacking reciprocity is entitled to prima facie evidence of being correct. 216
However, under the Hilton analysis, reciprocity is an integral party of
comity. 217
The Hilton court demonstrated the importance of reciprocity when
it said "the rule of reciprocity has worked itself firmly into the structure
of international jurisprudence." 218 This statement was made prior to the
section the Eralp court quoted, 219 which was referring to the mechanics
of applying the doctrine of reciprocity. 220 The key words in the sen-
tence are, "by the laws of which our own judgments are reviewable upon
the merits." 22 1 The Court in Hilton was referring to the countries whose
laws guide them to retry foreign judgments on the merits of the case. 222
Under reciprocity, as to countries that retry United States judgments on
the merits, the United States will not be obligated to consider the foreign
country judgments as conclusive. 223 Instead, the United States may retry
the foreign-country judgments, with the judgments being limited to
prima facie evidence of being correct. 224 However, if a country does not
retry the judgments of the United States, its judgments may be held
conclusive. 225
The Eralp court further obscures the reciprocity doctrine found in
Hilton when it discusses a number of cases rejecting the reciprocity
doctrine. The court describes the cases rejecting reciprocity directly
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 227 (1895) (concluding that "judgments rendered in France,
or in any other country, by the laws of which our own judgments are reviewable upon the merits, are
not entitled to full credit and conclusive effect when sued upon in this country, but are prima facie
evidence only of the justice of the plaintiff's claim").
217. Brand, supra note 1, at 261 (stating that "the Hilton case was ultimately decided on the issue
of reciprocity").
218. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 227.
219. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
220. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 227.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
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after discussing why, under Hilton, reciprocity is not a prerequisite to
enforcement. 226 This gives the impression that the cases cited are further
parallel evidence that reciprocity is not a prerequisite to enforcement.
However, the cases cited in Eralp do not support the Hilton analysis of
reciprocity. 227 They explicitly reject this analysis. 228 These cases do
find that reciprocity is not a prerequisite to enforcement. 229
The Eralp case highlights the problems in the United States with the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, especially in a state
with no case law or statutory provisions in the area. The question is what
a state like North Dakota should do. Implementing a foreign-country
judgment recognition statute would be a productive idea, since the state
has no statutory provision for the enforcement of foreign judgments.
There are a couple of advantages to this. First, the courts then have a
concrete provision to look at in applying the rules of foreign judgments.
Second, for those countries still requiring reciprocity, having a statute on
the subject is much easier for many foreign courts to analyze than case
law. However, if a case comes up again before such a statute is passed,
then an advisable option would be to follow an influential writing like
the Restatement. Although the state may wish to modify the given
factors, it gives a good starting point to begin the discussion of comity.
Also, the fundamental factors to look at enunciated in the Restatement of
Foreign Relations and the Recognition Act basically encompass the way
the individual states approach comity.
III. CANADIAN ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
One might think that the geographic closeness and cultural simi-
larities between the United States and Canada would have led to a con-
sistent history of foreign judgment recognition. However, such is not the
case. Although the United States has traditionally implemented a relative-
ly liberal enforcement policy, Canada, until recently has had a strict
226. Eralp, 290 N.W.2d at 243-44.
227. See, e.g., Somportex Limited v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 n.8 (3d
Cir. 1971).
In Hilton v. Guyot.... the Supreme Court spoke of the likelihood of reciprocity as a con-
dition precedent to the recognition of comity. The doctrine has received no more than
desultory acknowledgement .... It has been rejected by the courts of New York ...
and by statute in California .... We agree with the district court that this issue of the
enforceability of foreign judgments has not frequently been litigated in Pennsylvania, and
the Court has not been cited to, nor has independent examination revealed any
Pennsylvania cases which even intimate that a finding of reciprocity is an essential
precondition to their enforcing a foreign judgment.
Id.
228. Id.
229. See, e.g., id. at 440 (holding that "comity should be withheld only when its acceptance
would be contrary or prejudicial to the interest of the nation called upon to give it effect").
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enforcement policy. 230 The two countries are linked by NAFTA and are
the largest trading partners in the world. 231 This high-trade volume leads
inevitably to increased litigation. 232 In our friendly trade with Canada, it
is important that a fair and consistent policy of judgment enforcement is
realized. This way, parties in both countries can receive justice and free
trade can continue without hindrance.
The best way to achieve fairness and consistency is through a
foreign judgment agreement with Canada. Such an agreement would
have several advantages. First, it would be fair in the sense that both
countries could make an agreement consciously rather than leaving deci-
sions to individual courts, which may give inconsistent verdicts. Second,
standards would be the same for both countries, so both sides would be
less likely to "cry foul." Third, the standards would be consistent, so
judgments could be enforced efficiently. Fourth, individuals and corpo-
rations would better understand the standards for judgment enforcement
and they could modify their behavior accordingly.
Prior to 1990, Canada adhered to antiquated comity standards based
on rules developed in England during the nineteenth and early twentieth
century. 233 A pre-1990 court in Canada would not recognize a foreign
judgment 234 unless: 1) the defendant was either present in or a resident
of the foreign forum at the time the action began; or 2) the defendant
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the foreign court. 235 The
presence in the foreign jurisdiction was sufficient as long as the defen-
230. See Ivan F. Ivankovich, Enforcing U.S. Judgments in Canada: "Things are Looking Up!", 15
Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUs. 491, 491-93 (1995) (stating that prior to 1990, "Canadian courts utilized a rigid
approach developed in nineteenth century England to determine whether a 'foreign' judgment should
be given local effect"); see also Shirley Sostrequendo, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments in the United States and Canada in the Free Trade Era, 1992 DET. C.L. REV. 1019, 1020
(1992) (declaring that "until very recently ... the common law provinces of Canada have disallowed
the enforcement of foreign-country judgments within their borders").
231. See Ivankovich, supra note 230, at 491-92 (asserting that "Canada and the United States are
the world's largest trading partners").
232. See Sostrequendo, supra note 230, at 1032 (indicating that "there is... no doubt that litiga-
tion follows commerce, no matter how friendly the relations").
233. Id. at 1022. According to Sostrequendo, one of the most frequently quoted cases in Canada
is Emanuel v. Symon, I K.B. 302 (C.A. 1908). Id. The court in Emanuel considered five instances in
which a foreign judgment would be enforced:
(1) Where the defendant is a subject of the foreign country in which the judgment has
been obtained; (2) where he was resident in the foreign country when the action began;
(3) where the defendant in the character of plaintiff has selected the forum in which he
is afterwards sued; (4) where he has voluntarily appeared; and (5) where he has
contracted to submit himself to the forum in which the judgment was obtained.
Id.
234. Id. at 1020 n.3. In Canada, just as in the United States, the term "foreign judgment" refers
to both foreign country and sister-province (state) judgments. Id.
235. Id. at 1021-22 (citing to Philip J. Loree Jr., The Recognition and Enforcement of United
States Judgments in the Canadian Common-Law Provinces: The Problem of In Personam Jurisdiction,
15 BROOK J. INT'L L. 317, 318 (1989)).
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dant was not induced to enter the jurisdiction by fraud.236 Corporations
met the requirement of presence as long as they were "carrying on
business" in the foreign jurisdiction at the time the action was com-
menced. 237 Voluntary submission to the foreign court's jurisdiction
could be found in three situations: 1) if the defendant chose the same
forum as the plaintiff; 2) if the defendant voluntarily appeared in the
action; and 3) if defendants contracted to submit themselves to the
jurisdiction of the foreign court. 238
In 1991, the Supreme Court of Canada decided DeSavoye v. Mor-
guard Investments Ltd.,239 which radically changed the way "foreign
judgments" would be recognized and enforced. The case involved a
mortgage defaulted on by the Appellant (mortgagor), who originally
lived in Alberta, but moved to British Columbia. 240 Respondents, the
mortgagees, brought a foreclosure action in Alberta, in which the Appel-
lant failed to appear. 241 Pursuant to the Alberta court's judgment in
favor of Respondent, the mortgaged property was sold and judgments
were entered against Appellant.2 42 Respondents then brought actions in
British Columbia to enforce the deficiency judgments. 243 The issue was
whether a valid personal judgment in Alberta could be enforced in Brit-
ish Columbia. 244 The Supreme Court of Canada analyzed the common
law rules and found that the judgment could be enforced. 245
The court found that "the courts in one province should give full
faith and credit . . . to the judgments given by a court in another prov-
ince or a territory so long as that court has properly . . . exercised
jurisdiction in the action." 2 46 The Morguard court indicated that if a
traditional basis of jurisdiction is used, the judgment should be
enforced. 247 However, where such a basis is not available, such as in the
Morguard case, the court uses a "real and substantial connection"
236. Id. at 1022.
237. Id. at 1022-23.
238. Id. at 1023.
239. 1990 D.L.R. LEXIS 636, at *2 (Can.) (holding that the appeal by De Savoye of the judgment
enforced in favor of Morguard should be dismissed).
240. Morguard Invs. Ltd. v. De Savoye, 1990 D.L.R. LEXIS 636, at *1 (Can.).
241. Id.
242. Id. at 1-2.
243. Id. at 2.
244. Id. at 14-15.
245. Id. at 52 (determining that the Alberta court had jurisdiction, and its judgment should be
recognized and enforceable in British Columbia).
246. Id. at 42.
247. Id. at 44. The court stated that the question of whether a court exercised its jurisdiction
reasonably is affirmed if a "traditionally accepted" basis is used. Id. The court referred to two such
bases: "in the case of judgments in personam where the defendant was within the jurisdiction at the
time of the action or when he submitted to its judgment whether by agreement or attornment." Id.
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test. 248 There must be a "real and substantial connection" between the
litigation and the forum rendering the decision. 249 The court deter-
mined there was a "connection" in this case because the properties in
question were in Alberta, and the contracts were entered into in Alberta
by persons who, at the time, were residents of Alberta.250
The rationale for the decision rested on several different factors.
The court found that the old rule came about in the 19th century 25 1
when travel between countries was impractical. 252 It was also based on
England's view that foreign country judicial systems were inferior.253
However, this isolationism, the court found, does not comport with the
modem world. 25 4  It concluded that, "Modem states ...cannot live in
splendid isolation and do give effect to judgments given in other coun-
tries in certain circumstances." 255
Morguard has liberalized judgment enforcement in Canada, but it
has not unified judgment enforcement. Just as the United States has a
patchwork standard of judgment enforcement, so does Canada, in that
foreign judgment enforcement is governed by provincial law.256 Gener-
ally, since Morguard, a United States judgment is more likely to be
enforced than before. 257 However, there are important exceptions to
Morguard's reach. Two provinces have statutory provisions and are not
bound to follow the Morguard rule. 258 Also, the rule would generally
not be applicable to international judgments sought to be enforced in
Quebec. 259
248. Id. at 45-46.
249. Id. at 48-50.
250. Id. at 52.
25 1. Id. at 28 (determining that "the common law regarding the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments is firmly anchored in the principle of territoriality as interpreted by the English
courts in the 19th Century").
252. Id. at 33. The court stated that, "one can understand the difficulty in which a defendant in
England would find himself in defending an action initiated in a far comer of the world in the then
state of travel and communications." Id. The court concluded that the world has changed a great deal
since the common law rules were developed in 19th century England. Id. at 34. "Modem means of
travel and communications have made many of these 19th century concerns appear parochial." Id.
253. Id. at 33-34 (declaring that when the old rule was formulated "there was an exaggerated
concern about the quality of justice that might be meted out to British residents abroad").
254. Id. at 34.
255. Id. at 29.
256. Ivankovich, supra note 230, at 496-97 (outlining "The Recognition and Enforcement of
United States Judgments: Post-Morguard").
257. Sostrequendo, supra note 230, at 1026 (stating that "the cases involving U.S. judgments that
have followed Morguard indicate that... Canadian courts are willing to begin enforcing U.S. judg-
ments in Canada").
258. Ivankovich, supra note 230, at 492 (declaring that due to "specific statutory provisions in
Saskatchewan and New Brunswick, Morguard's expansion of the common law grounds for
recognition has been held inapplicable in its entirety to all extraprovincial judgments in those two
provinces").
259. Id. at 492.
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Therefore, although the enforcement of foreign country judgments
in Canada has been brought out of the 19th century, more needs to be
done as we fast approach the 21st century. Canada is now leaning
towards the openness that the United States has exemplified in enforcing
foreign judgments. Nevertheless, just like the United States, its enforce-
ment policy is often inconsistent. An agreement could confirm this new
openness and make enforcement more widespread, consistent, and fair.
IV. MEXICAN ENFORCEMENT POLICIES
Just like Canada, Mexico has been wary of enforcing foreign
country judgments. Prior to 1988, Mexico disallowed the enforcement
of foreign judgments. 260 However, in 1988, three presidential decrees
were amended to regulate conflict-of-law questions inherent in the
international arena. 261 Mexico's Federal Code of Civil Procedure
(Codigo Federal de Procedimientos Civiles) now deals with the enforce-
ment of foreign judgments. 262 The first requirement is "proper and
valid jurisdiction" by the foreign judge.263 According to Article 564 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, "The jurisdiction assumed by the foreign
court shall be recognized in Mexico regarding the enforcement of a
judgment, when said jurisdiction has been assumed by reasons resulting
compatible or analogous with the national law, save in those cases which
are of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Mexican courts." 264 Article 565
recognizes jurisdiction of the foreign court if jurisdiction was assumed to
avoid a denial of justice. 265 Article 566 recognizes forum selection
clauses as long as the chosen court "does not'imply a de facto impedi-
ment or denial of justice." 266 This is read in conjunction with Article
567, which declares a forum selection not valid when it results in the
exclusive benefit of one party to the contract, but not all of the parties. 267
If proper jurisdiction has been established, the judgment must also
not be "contrary to the internal public order." 268 This is similar to the
public policy defense in the United States. Then, in order to have
''exclusive effect," foreign country judgments must comply with the
following conditions:
260. Jorge A. Vargas, Enforcement of Judgments in Mexico: The 1988 Rules of the Federal
Code of Civil Procedure, 14 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 376, 380 (1994).
261. Id. at 380.
262. Id. at 397.
263. Id. at 398.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. See Id. (declaring that Article 566 "should be read in conjunction with Article 567").
268. Id. at 400.
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1) That the formalities provided for in this code regarding
letters rogatory from abroad, have been satisfied; 2) that they
have not been rendered as a consequence of the exercise of a
realty action; 3) that the judge or sentencing court had
jurisdiction to take cognizance and decide the matter in
accordance with the recognized rules in the international
sphere compatible with those adopted by this code; 4) that the
defendant had been summoned or served in a personal manner
in order to assure him or her a fair trial, and the exercise of his
or her defenses; 5) to be res judicata in the country that
rendered them, or that there is no ordinary recourse against
them; 6) that the action generating them is not the subject of
another suit still pending between the same parties in Mexican
courts, and in which suit the Mexican court has prevailed, or at
least the letter rogatory had been transmitted and delivered to
the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs or to the authorities of the
State where service of summons is to take place. This same
rule is to be applied when a definite judgment is rendered; 7)
that the obligation requested to be carried out is not contrary to
the public order in Mexico; and 8) that the requirements to be
considered as authentic are complied with.269
Once a foreign judgment has jumped through all these hoops, there
is still another ground upon which enforcement can be denied: reci-
procity.270 At the Mexican judge's discretion, judgment may be denied
if similar decisions are not enforced in the forum court. 271 However,
three things should be remembered here. First, lack of reciprocity must
be proven, not the existence of reciprocity. 272 Second, reciprocity is
only relevant when applied to similar cases in the forum court. 273 Third,
the judgment not to enforce is discretionary. 274
Like Canada, Mexico has liberalized its enforcement of foreign
judgments. 275 However, more needs to be done. Mexico does have a
central set of laws on the subject, unlike Canada and the United States.276
Yet, Mexico's system is complicated and comparatively youthful.
269. Id. at 402.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 403 (stating that "it is not necessary to prove the existence of reciprocity before a
Mexican judge to obtain the enforcement, but to prove the lack of it to enjoin such enforcement").
273. Id.
274. ld.
275. See Id. at 380 (determining that Mexico has gone from not allowing judgment enforcement
to having the area regulated by presidential decrees).
276. Id. (indicating that judgment enforcement is regulated by the code of civil procedure).
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Mexico's judges have not been enforcing judgments for very many
years, which may lead to inconsistencies. Also, an agreement by the
NAFTA countries could clarify important issues. For instance, all three
countries are concerned with jurisdiction in enforcing judgments. If an
agreement is made, the three countries may be able to agree upon some
acceptable bases of jurisdiction. That way, all three countries have an
understanding of what jurisdiction means, rather than merely applying
their own definition of jurisdiction to the dismay of the other states.
This discussion leads to problem areas among the NAFTA countries
because of their varying enforcement policies.
V. PROBLEM AREAS WITHIN NAFTA
One area where an agreement between the signatory nations of
NAFTA would be effective is in antitrust regulation. Canada and the
United States have a similar history in this area, but Mexico has just
recently begun this type of regulation. 277 The United States, with its free
enterprise market, has strict regulations for antitrust violations, including
civil judgments with treble damages and attorneys' fees awarded. 278 The
United States has provisions prohibiting: 1) "joint conduct that un-
reasonably restrains 'trade or commerce . . .' with foreign nations;" 279
2) attempts at conspiracies to monopolize and monopolization; 280 3)
unfair competition; 28 1 and 4) certain acquisitions by merger, or joint
venture. 282 As will be shown below, the United States allows a wide
jurisdictional swath across national boundaries.
277. Mark R. Joelson, Is There Three-Party Commitment to the Effective Enforcement of National
Antitrust Laws?, 40 FED. B. NEWS & J. 573, 574 (1993).
278. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-45 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
279. See 15 U.S.C. § I (Supp. 1998). The provision broadly states, "Every contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal." Id.
280. Id. § 2. The provision reads in pertinent part, "Every person who shall monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a felony." Id.
281. Id. § 45(a)(1).
282. Id. § 18. A portion of this provision reads,
No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall acquire,
directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no
person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the
whole or any part of the assets of another person engaged also in commerce or in any
activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition
may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
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Due to a 1993 case, Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California,283
the jurisdictional stretch of United States antitrust regulations widened. 284
The case involved London reinsurers who argued that Sherman Act rules
did not apply to their activities because their conduct is more reasonably
under the jurisdiction of Britain, not America. 285 However, the Court
held that since there was no direct conflict between United States and
British law and policy, there was no basis under international comity to
refrain from this antitrust jurisdiction. 286
The Department of Justice also applies broad jurisdictional stan-
dards in enforcing antitrust laws.287 In 1992, Attorney General William
P. Barr announced a return to the looser pre-1988 policy, meaning that
enforcement action may be taken against conduct that occurs overseas,
which restrains United States exports, whether or not there is direct harm
to American consumers.288 In general, American laws have the ability to
cross national boundaries, particularly with Mexico and Canada.
Canada also has a long history of antitrust legislation, although,
until recently, it was limited to criminal legislation. 289 The legislation,
although similar to that of the United States, does not generally have
the extraterritorial element that the United States does.29 0 It makes
it a criminal offense to conspire "with another person to prevent or
lessen, unduly, competition ..... 291 However, Canada does prohibit
a person outside the country from implementing directives to those
within Canada, if the directives would have violated Section 45 had they
been made within Canada. 292 Also, it has a "blocking provision" that is
283. 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
284. See Joelson, supra note 277, at 575 (declaring that "the United States Supreme Court
rendered an opinion in an insurance antitrust case, Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, that will
severely delimit the applicability of the jurisdictional rule of reason in future cases").
285. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 795-96 (1993). The Court quoted
the London reinsurers:
Our position is not that the Sherman Act does not apply in the sense that a minimal basis
for the exercise of jurisdiction doesn't exist here. Our position is that there are certain
circumstances, and that this is one of them, in which the interests of another state are
sufficient that the exercise of that jurisdiction should be restrained.
Id. at 795.
286. Id. at 798-99. The Court said, "'The fact that conduct is lawful in the state in which it took
place will not, of itself, bar application of the United States antitrust laws,' even where the foreign
state has a strong policy to permit or encourage such conduct." Id. at 799 (citing RESTATEMENT OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS § 415 cmt. j).
287. Joelson, supra note 277, at 575.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, § 45(l)(c).
292. Id. § 46.
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designed to block foreign judgments, laws, and directives which cause
anti-competitive effects. 293
Mexico has just entered the world of antitrust regulations by legisla-
tion passed in 1992.294 There are prohibitions against monopolies 295
and monopolistic practices 296 as well as provisions nullifying restrictive
steps taken by local governments. 297 The Federal Competition Commis-
sion, "a decentralized administrative organ of the Secretariat of Com-
merce and Industrial Development," investigates and seeks to prevent
antitrust violations. 298 Mexican law does not specifically address what
antitrust rules apply in trade situations. 299
There are important differences among NAFTA states, particularly
between Mexico and the other two nations, but only limited steps have
been taken to alleviate these differences.300 Mere pledges to maintain
national competition law measures and to foster effective competition
law enforcement in the free trade area are the only steps that have been
taken. 30 1 These pledges, although well intentioned, do not go far
enough. Free trade, that is free movement of products and capital across
national boundaries, is inhibited by a patchwork quilt of antitrust laws.
Add this fact to the varying judgment enforcement policies and there is a
problem with confusion of laws. 'Companies will be subject to at least
three different antitrust regimes. Consequently, the most restrictive law
may be the only one with any real meaning for some companies. Also,
293. Joelson, supra note 277, at 576.
294. Introduction to the Federal Law of Economic Competition," D.O., Dec. 24, 1992 (stating that
the "Federal Law on Economic Competition" was introduced in December 1992).
295. Id. art. 8. This provision states that, "Monopolies and state-sanctioned monopolies are pro-
hibited, as well as practices which, within the terms of this law, may diminish, damage or impede
competition and free trade in the production, processing, distribution, and sale of goods or services."
Id.
296. Id. art. 9. This provision states that monopolistic practices "shall have no legal effect and
the economic agents who engage in their commission shall be subject to the sanctions set forth in this
law ...." Id.
297. Id. art. 14. The provision states that "the acts of state authorities for the purpose of directly
or indirectly prohibiting domestic or foreign merchandise or services from entering or leaving their
territory shall have no legal effect." Id.
298. Id. art. 23. This provision reads,
The Federal Competition Commission is a decentralized administrative organ of the
Secretariat of Commerce and Industrial Development, which enjoys technical and
operating autonomy, and whose duty is to prevent, investigate, and combat monopolies,
monopolistic practices, and combinations, within the terms of this law, and which shall
act independently in issuing its decisions.
Id.
299. Joelson, supra note 277, at 576 (concluding that "Mexican law does not address explicitly
the question of what antitrust rules apply in import and export transaction situations except that there is
an exemption for associations or cooperatives which sell certain products directly abroad").
300. Id. at 573.
301. See NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1501. Article 1501 states "Each Party shall adopt or main-
tain measures to proscribe anti-competitive business conduct and take appropriate action with respect
thereto." Id.
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plaintiffs may forum-shop for the most friendly forum in which to sue.
A better policy would be to harmonize, not necessarily integrate, impor-
tant legal provisions between free trade countries. This would allow a
proactive, coherent analysis of the problems inherent in lowering trade
barriers, which is preferable to merely reacting to the problems as they
develop.
Another area that has raised interesting issues in the enforcement of
foreign judgments is libel litigation. In the modem age of informatiza-
tion, media outlets distribute information across the globe, crossing
national boundaries. Since other countries, like Canada and Great
Britain, have stricter libel laws than the United States, media outlets in the
United States must be wary of being sued in foreign countries.302 This
also allows potential plaintiffs to forum-shop, suing in the most libel-
friendly jurisdiction. 303 Although the libel issue is not just relevant in
discussing NAFTA states, it provides an opportunity to discuss important
issues involving foreign judgments.
Recently, courts in the United States have not been willing to
enforce foreign libel judgments in the United States because the judg-
ments were found to be against public policy. In Bachan v. India
Abroad Publications Inc., 3 0 4 the New York Supreme Court refused to
enforce a British libel judgment against a United States media
defendant. 305 The court ruled that when foreign libel judgments conflict
with First Amendment values, they are against the public policy of the
United States.3 06 Another important decision was Matusevitch v. Telni-
koff,307 where another British libel judgment was not recognized. 308 The
Matusevitch court found that the British judgment was repugnant to the
public policy of Maryland and the United States because British defama-
tion law lacks First Amendment protections. 309
It is only a matter of time before a similar Canadian libel judgment
will be taken to a United States court to be enforced. This illustrates a
302. Jeremy Maltby, Juggling Comity and Self Government: The Enforcement of Foreign Libel
Judgments in U.S. Courts, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1978, 1979 (1994) (indicating that "in contrast to the
speech-protective standard employed by the United States, countries such as Britain and Canada have
libel laws that favor plaintiffs' interests in privacy and reputation").
303. See id. at 1979-80.
304. 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).
305. Maltby, supra note 302, at 1981.
306. Id. at 1982.
307. 877 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1995).
308. Rachel V. Korsower, Matusevitch v. Telnikoff: The First Amendment Travels Abroad, Pre-
venting Recognition and Enforcement of a British Libel Judgment, 19 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 225
(1995).
309. Id.
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major problem with conflicting laws when there is free-movement of
goods, persons, capital and, in this case, information. Simply having a
liberal enforcement policy does not solve this problem. Harmonization
of laws is also unlikely.
However, this is an area where it would simplify the situation by
having one national standard for the enforcement of foreign judgments
in the United States. It would be easier for United States courts to apply
and the guidelines would be concrete so that foreign countries, particu-
larly Canada and Mexico, would at least know what to expect from
United States courts. This further explains why a foreign judgment
agreement with the United States' free trade partners would be profit-
able. The European Union provides an example for the United States in
making these kind of agreements.
VI. EUROPEAN UNION POLICY IN ENFORCING JUDGMENTS
Although the European Union is much further along the path to
economic and political integration than its North American counterpart,
it provides a useful analogy for other states pursuing free trade agree-
ments. There are many variables in regard to just economic integration
and the European Union is the best model to look at in analyzing
integration.
The European Union, which began with the Rome Treaty in 1959,
began to deal with judgment recognition and enforcement in its 1968
Brussels Convention. 3 10 Unlike the attempts at uniformity in the United
States, the European Union does not simply have a list of acceptable
bases of jurisdiction. It also lists bases of exorbitant jurisdiction.a3 1
However, these are only applicable to persons domiciled in a Member
State. 3 12 Once jurisdiction is established, the general rule is that a
judgment shall be recognized in the foreign state, without any special
procedures required. 313
However, just as in most American jurisprudence, a number of man-
datory defenses are provided, if the foreign judgment is: 1) contrary to
public policy; 2) a default judgment given without service in time to
defend; 3) irreconcilable with a judgment in dispute between the same
310, Ronald A. Brand, Enforcement of Judgments in the United States and Europe, 13 J.L. & COM.
193, 201 (1994).
311. See 1990 O.J. (C 189)3.
312. Id. (stating that "Persons domiciled in a Contracting State may be sued in the courts of
another Contracting State only by virtue of the rules set out in Sections 2 to 6 of this Title").
313. Id. at 26.
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parties in the recognizing state; 4) goes beyond the issue in dispute and
requires determination of a matter of status or legal capacity or rights in
property arising out of a matrimonial relationship, wills, or succession; or
5) irreconcilable with an earlier judgment from a non-Contracting State
which is entitled to recognition and is on the same cause of action. 314
The Union also provides a mechanism for agreements with non Euro-
pean Union countries. A Contracting State in the European Union may
enter into a treaty or agreement with a non-Contracting State on the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.315
The uniformity of the European Union's law for the recognition
and enforcement of judgments is something that the United States could
benefit from. Canada, Mexico, and the United States could have the
same or similar policies, just as the countries in Europe have the same
policy. Some may say that this is a loss of sovereignty. However, this is
not the case. More problems will be solved than created. For instance,
although the European Union has an integrated policy for the enforce-
ment of judgments, there is still a defense for something contrary to the
state's public policy. 3 16 This factor depends on the policy of each
individual nation. Thus, national guarantees could still be in effect, while
all the countries gain from simplicity and clarity.
VII. CONCLUSION
The inefficiency of the United States present system of enforcing
judgments is problematic in the international arena. The fact that there
are fifty-one different laws creates problems. Courts, like those in North
Dakota, may have a difficult time defining the law and applying the law,
especially when there is no applicable statute.3 17 Further, foreign coun-
tries may have a difficult time figuring out what the law is with fifty-one
different jurisdictions, many of which have no statutes on the subject.
Some kind of international agreement would be a good first step in
building bridges of comity. It would preempt any state legislation,
thereby making one standard, instead of fifty-one different standards. 3 18
314. Id. at 27.
315. Id. at 59 (explaining that "this convention shall not prevent a Contracting State from assum-
ing, in a convention on the recognition and enforcement of judgments an obligation towards a third
state not to recognize judgments given in other Contracting States ... .
316. Id. at 27.
317. See Medical Arts Building Limited v. Eralp, 290 N.W.2d 241, 246 (N.D. 1980) (holding that
the North Dakota Century Code does not deal with foreign country judgments).
318. See Brand, supra note 1, at 292 (stating that federal law under article VI of the United States
Constitution would preempt state law).
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The most workable and pragmatic 'place to begin such a treaty
would be with NAFTA countries, Canada, and Mexico. Not only would
it help centralize United States policy, but it would help clarify the
policies of Canada and Mexico, respectively. If Canada, Mexico, and the
United States are to have a successful free-trade relationship, these issues
will have to be dealt with. Then, at least the issues will be dealt with
consciously, rather than reacting to the inevitable issues when they arise.
Delvin J. Losing

